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Article

Dealing with Mass Incarceration
Alfred Blumstein†
INTRODUCTION
In today’s highly polarized political environment, one of the
few issues on which one can see widespread agreement across
the parties is the desire to reduce prison populations.1 This
agreement results from the nation’s impressively high incarceration rate (typically described as “mass incarceration”), which is
almost five times its formerly stable rate, several times higher
than all the other developed countries, and is essentially the
highest rate in the world.2 Such agreement also flies in the face
of the impressively low crime rate currently prevailing in the
United States.3
Despite this agreement, however, there are strong forces
vigorously committed to a “tough on crime” policy and strongly
opposed to such reductions.4 That opposition comes from a rela-

† J. Erik Jonsson University Professor of Urban Systems and Operations
Research, Emeritus, Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University. The author
wants to acknowledge Allen Beck for a variety of analyses discussed in this paper, many parts of which draw on our previously published collaborations. Copyright © 2020 by Alfred Blumstein.
1. 91 Percent of Americans Support Criminal Justice Reform, ACLU Polling Finds, ACLU (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/91
-percent-americans-support-criminal-justice-reform-aclu-polling-finds [https://
perma.cc/5VLD-DAKF].
2. ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 1 (6th ed. 2006).
3. Samuel Stebbins, The Midwest is Home to Many of America’s Most Dangerous Cities, USA TODAY (Oct. 26, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
money/2019/10/26/crime-rate-higher-us-dangerous-cities/40406541 [https://
perma.cc/3JZC-L6FK] (“There were 369 violent crimes committed in 2018 for
every 100,000 Americans, nearly the lowest violent crime rate in the United
States in more than three decades.”).
4. See, e.g., Alan Greenblatt, “Tough on Crime” Trump Comes Out for Sentencing Reform, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www
.theamericanconservative.com/articles/tough-on-crime-comes-out-for
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tively small political minority who primarily seem to want to exploit the political advantage5 of appealing to a public who are
regularly confronted with news about crime (resulting from the
journalistic motto of “if it bleeds, it leads”) and so, overperceive
their risks of crime victimization.6 Also, much of the public views
incarceration as the dominant and universally effective means
of controlling crime, even when it may be of minimal effectiveness, such as with the incarceration of drug sellers, when incarceration more often serves to recruit replacements, rather than
deterring or incapacitating drug sales.7
There have been a wide variety of attempts in the literature
to respond to mass incarceration by seeking approaches that
would reduce the prison population.8 Some authors even propose
a target for the reduction; typically, the most extreme target is a
reduction of about 50%,9 which would not even come close to the
incarceration rates of other developed nations. There are many
possible approaches to the reduction, and they warrant investigation to assess their effectiveness, crime or other costs they
might incur, and their political feasibility in different jurisdictions. For example, Frank Zimring emphasizes one approach
designated as “realignment” based on the prison-reduction approach that has been taken in his home state of California, and
he emphasizes similar approaches more generally.10 He also recognizes how many of the reductions in prison population have

-sentencing-reform [https://perma.cc/JN4H-LFRF] (describing various actions
that President Trump took that signaled to supporters that he was “tough on
crime”).
5. Cf. Lorna Collier, Incarceration Nation, 45 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N 56
(2014) (explaining how legislators and politicians found it politically advantageous to continue to pursue punitive crime control policies despite their cost).
6. THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 121 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014).
7. Alfred Blumstein, Making Rationality Relevant—The American Society
of Criminology 1992 Presidential Address, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 7 (1993).
8. Cf. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 217 (2010) (explaining the difficulties with dismantling mass incarceration).
9. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Remodeling American Sentencing: A Ten-Step
Blueprint for Moving Past Mass Incarceration, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
503, 503 (2014).
10. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE INSIDIOUS MOMENTUM OF MASS INCARCERATION (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript ch. 1 at 18).
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imposed heavy burdens on local jails and offers many suggestions for easing that burden.11 In this paper, I raise some questions about the effectiveness of Zimring’s approaches and explore
a number of alternatives.
Zimring addresses two important themes of how mass incarceration came about and how to bring it down. In the last chapter
of his forthcoming book, he also addresses an important aspect
of the widespread criminalization in the United States and the
collateral consequences suffered by a large number of people,
and how these consequences can last well beyond the explicit
punishment given to them, often for people’s entire lives.12 Many
of the collateral consequences are predominantly targeted at reducing the risks of future crimes that might be associated with
identified offenders,13 but they rarely address the empirical reality that those risks diminish with time free from further involvement with the criminal justice system and that redemption
from the burdens people suffer would be provided by dropping
the consequences altogether.14
I. AN EARLIER PERIOD OF STABLE INCARCERATION
RATE
The dramatic rise of incarceration in the 1980s and 1990s is
well-established. This rise is demonstrated in Figure 1, which
depicts the incarceration rate (the annual number of state and
federal prisoners divided by the United States population that
year), over almost a century from 1920 to 2017.15

11. Id. (manuscript ch. 9 at 23).
12. Id. (manuscript ch. 10 at 2).
13. See generally id. (manuscript ch. 10) (discussing the thousands of restrictions and prohibitions imposed on offenders and the secondary impacts on
those with relationships to the offender).
14. Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence
of Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327 (2009).
15. Figures 1, 2, and 4 are based on official data from the Bureau of Justice
Statistics. See JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2017, at 41 (2019), https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf [https://perma.cc/EC5K-BYFW]; DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS 1925–81, at 1 (1982),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p2581.pdf [https://perma.cc/HV3Q-8B72];
see also THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 1 (2019),
https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in
-US-Corrections.pdf [https://perma.cc/GH7U-YMZK].
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Fig. 1: US Incarceration Rate: 1920-2017
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Figure 2 further demonstrates that there was relative stability
in the incarceration rate for the first half of that century.

The horizontal trend line depicts the rather stable incarceration
rate of 110 per 100,000 (or 0.11% of the U.S. population), with a
standard deviation of about 8%, that prevailed in the United
States from the 1920s to the early 1970s.16 From the figure, we
can see that there was a rise of incarceration during the depression years of the 1930s and a clear decline during World War II,
16. See supra note 15.

2020]

DEALING WITH MASS INCARCERATION

2655

when the nation had much better uses for its young men than to
have them lingering in prison cells.17 Those societal impacts
clearly affected the ups and downs of that stable rate.
During this whole period, the operational policies of the
criminal justice system were under control of the functionaries
within that system. If the prison population was getting too high
and prisons were getting overcrowded, then a somewhat earlier
release on parole could accommodate that.18 On the other hand,
if there was slack in prisons, then the system could pay more
attention to crimes of lesser concern like pornography or the sex
trade.19 A paper documenting these observations was published
in 1973,20 just as the national incarceration rate was beginning
its dramatic climb as shown in Figure 1, which almost surely
contradicted this otherwise interesting academic theory.
II. THE DRAMATIC RISE OF INCARCERATION RATE
As is evident from Figure 1, there was a slight growth in the
1970s followed by a dramatic rise in the 1980s and 1990s, and a
rather stable pattern after 2000. While there was some rise in
the 1970s and general stability after 2000, there was a slight increase from 2007 to 2008 and a slight decrease after that. The
bulk of the increase occurred in the 1980s and 1990s.
As documented by Allen Beck and myself,21 it is useful to
consider the factors contributing to the dramatic rise shown in
Figure 1. The rise could be attributable to an increase in any
combination of the four following factors:
• reported crimes;
• arrests per crime;
• commitments to prison per arrest; and
• time served in prison.22
An analysis of the trends in these four aspects shows that
there was no major increase in reported crimes over this period.23 Furthermore, there was no major increase in arrests per
17. See supra note 15.
18. Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, A Theory of the Stability of Punishment, 63 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 198, 204 (1973).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons,
1980–1996, 26 CRIME & JUST. 17 (1999).
22. Id. at 39.
23. Id. at 29 fig.4.
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crime24—a somewhat surprising result in light of the significant
improvements in policing technology and management over that
period. Virtually the entire growth has been attributable to increases in the rate of commitments per reported arrest and in
time served.25 Both are associated with decisions at the stages of
prosecution, adjudication, sentencing, probation, parole, and beyond.26 These stages were influenced by legislation that affected
decision-making at each time.27 During the early years of the
rise, until about 1993, about three-quarters of the growth was
attributable to commitments; after that, the strongest impact
was associated with time served.28
That phenomenon is important because one must pay attention to these stages if one is to have any meaningful impact on
reducing the incarceration rate. This focus should include decisions of the prosecutors, judges, and parole boards, and certainly
the legislatures that prescribe both limits and opportunities to
these decision-makers.
III. THE DYNAMICS OF THE RISE
Analysis of the dynamics of the rise in incarceration started
in the 1970s as narcotic drugs became more widely available in
illegal markets. As I saw it, the rise was initiated by parents who
saw their children and their friends, mid-teenagers and beyond,
involved as consumers in those markets.29 They became particularly concerned about those dangers and turned to the political
system, particularly legislators, and pushed for them to “do
something” to address that problem. At first, legislators saw little that they could do because the criminal justice system had
largely been operating on its own. Then, the politically astute
legislators came to realize that sentencing practices were con-

24. Id. at 41.
25. Id. at 33–36.
26. Id. at 33.
27. Id. at 57.
28. Id. at 33.
29. These insights derive from my involvement with the criminal justice
system, not only as an academic but also as a participant in the policy process.
I started as a member of the Allegheny County Regional Planning Council of
the Governor’s Justice Commission (1969–73) and then as chairman of the
Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (1979–90), the agency
that coordinated criminal justice programs in the state and allocated Federal
funds to that purpose, and as a member of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission (1987–97).
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strained by long-standing sentencing law, primarily by specifying maximum and minimum sentences for various ranges of offenses. Also, in many cases, the violations of possessing or even
selling illegal drugs had not been seen as serious enough to warrant incarceration, so violators were often sentenced to probation.
Thus, those sentencing laws became reasonable targets for
“doing something.” First, probation was seen as a reasonable target, so some level of jail or prison sentence could be made mandatory. Then, it would be reasonable to attach a reasonably low
mandatory-minimum sentence of two years. That failed to affect
the drug trade, so five years became the norm, and then still
higher, even to life sentences for certain crimes and prior records. This still did not do much to affect drug trafficking because
the illegal drug market was quite facile in recruiting replacements for those taken off the streets for however long.
It is also interesting to note the timing of the replacements
and the population from which they were drawn. Arrest reports
maintained by the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) show an
increase in adult arrests for drug offenses in the early 1980s, but
not much growth in juvenile drug arrests.30 Starting in 1985,
however, there was significant growth in juvenile drug arrests,
primarily of African-American juveniles.31 Many of these arrests
occurred for selling crack, a variant of powder cocaine, in markets that were operated in the streets, predominantly by African
Americans.32 Inevitably, the street markets also provide a locus
for violence. Everyone operating a street drug market had to
carry a gun in order to defend themselves against a robber targeting their money or their drugs.33 Inevitably, those guns were
associated with violence between a seller and a cheated consumer, or between competing sellers.34
In 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act that provided for a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for 500
grams of cocaine, but for only 5 grams of crack.35 This outrageous
30. See TINA L. DORSEY & PRISCILLA MIDDLETON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DRUGS AND CRIME FACTS 19 (1994), https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dcf.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6VD-R5LZ].
31. Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry,
86 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 10–36 (1995).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-3.
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100:1 ratio undoubtedly reflected a response to the violence associated with crack markets, but some saw it as having involved
racist intentions.36 This system disproportionality stayed in
place until 2010 when Congress replaced it; but this new law still
retained an 18:1 crack-to-powder ratio.37
One important negative consequence of the growing presence of juveniles in the crack markets was lesser restraint in the
use of guns.38 Young sellers and their colleagues were involved
in a major increase in homicide by and against young African
Americans.39 Thus, the naïveté in the heavy-handed mandatory
minimum sentencing laws not only failed to have much impact
on the marketing of drugs because of the replacement of adult
dealers with juveniles, but it also gave rise to the recruitment of
a more dangerous and less restrained body of sellers.40
The legislators who invoked the mandatory-minimum sentencing laws were not likely to study the degree to which those
laws failed to impact the operation of markets, but the laws did
“work” in the sense that they resulted in public appreciation and
approval, largely because the public generally holds the view
that incarceration inherently “works” to reduce crime and that
more incarceration works even better.41 The more subtle distinctions between punishments that reduce crime through deterrence or incapacitation and punishments that are frustrated by
accommodations in the crime markets are sufficiently complex
to not enter such political assessments.
Seeing the political success of their “tough on drugs” actions
provided an incentive to legislators to do the same with other
crimes, especially those of significant public concern like violent
crimes and sex offenses. Legislative actions involving mandatory-minimum sentencing laws, fixed-sentencing laws replacing
minimum/maximum laws, and three-strikes laws also propagated.42 All this strengthened the prosecutors’ hands in their
plea negotiations, sent messages to the judges encouraging
tougher sentences, and encouraged parole boards to be more

36. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM: 20 YEARS
OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW (2006).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372.
Blumstein, supra note 31, at 5.
Id.
Id. at 8–9.
THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 6, at 121.
Id. at 123.
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risk-averse in who they released on parole and recommitted following parole violations.43 All of these things contributed to the
growth in incarceration during this period.44
In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act that awarded grants to states for prison
construction, so long as they passed laws requiring that offenders convicted of Part 1 violent crimes (murder, rape, aggravated
assault, and robbery) serve at least 85% of their sentence.45 In
contrast to most of the other federal sentencing laws that relate
primarily to federal courts, this law addressed state policies.46
Thus, the federal fiscal incentives provided contributed directly
to the growth in time served in state prisons.47 It is ironic that
this 1994 law (known informally as the “Truth in Sentencing”
law) was one of the last federal “tough on crime” laws responding
to the growth of violent-crime rates since 1986,48 but 1994 was
the start of the major national “crime drop,”49 which would not
be reflected in the UCR crime reports until late 1995.
As should have been expected, there was no significant identifiable impact on drug offending, but there was an important
shift in the demand for crack, largely as a consequence of the
growing realization of some of the personal side-effects of crack
use.50 This reduction in the demand for crack began in the early
1990s, and it resulted in a lesser involvement of African-American juveniles in drug markets and a consequent decline in their
arrests for drug offenses,51 as well as a related decline in their
43. Id. at 110.
44. Id.
45. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 49
(2007).
46. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
47. Id.
48. Cf. Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman, The Recent Rise and Fall of
American Violence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 6 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel
Wallman eds., 2d ed. 2006).
49. Id.
50. LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., MONITORING THE FUTURE: NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS ON DRUG USE 1975–2013, at 379–80 (2013), http://www
.monitoringthefuture.org//pubs/monographs/mtf-vol1_2013.pdf [https://perma
.cc/8ZVQ-7RJW].
51. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, AGE-SPECIFIC ARREST RATES AND
RACE-SPECIFIC ARREST RATES FOR SELECTED OFFENSES 1993–2001, at 63
(2003), https://ucr.fbi.gov/additional-ucr-publications/age_race_arrest93-01
.pdf.
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rates of arrest and victimizations for homicide.52 Also, the economy was thriving at the time, so there were many other employment opportunities.53 All of that contributed to the break-up of
the drug markets, especially the crack markets that were then
being served largely by young people, which led to a major drop
in violent crime until 2000, particularly homicide and robbery,
as displayed in Figure 3.54 There are a number of differing explanations for the 45% drop from the peak in about 1993 to a
leveling-out after 2000.55

Incarceration Rate

Fig. 3: Uniform Crime Reporting, Murder and
Robbery Rates: 1960-2018
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10
8
6
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60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20
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During the 1960s, the murder rate (represented by the chart line starting and ending between 4–6%) was well above the robbery rate (represented by the chart line starting and ending below 4%) divided by 25
(to put it on the same scale as murder), but the two are very close for
the rest of the interval.

52. Id. at 59.
53. Unemployment Rate in the United States from 1990 to 2019, STATISTA
https://www.statista.com/statistics/193290/unemployment-rate-in-the-usa
-since-1990 [https://perma.cc/29AT-NAYX].
54. Figure 3 is based on official statistics from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Rates publications. See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.1 (2018), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime
-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/tables/table-1 [https://perma.cc/YMZ8
-4VW9].
55. See, Richard Rosenfeld, Patterns in Adult Homicide: 1980–1995 in
BLUMSTEIN & WALLMAN, THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA, supra note 48, at 131
(describing two institutional shifts that contributed partially to this decline).
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IV. THE SLOW BEGINNINGS OF A REDUCTION
Despite the major drop in violent crimes, which comprise an
important fraction of prison populations, the national incarceration rate since 2000, depicted in Figure 4, appears to have been
impressively stable, even at its 2017 high rate of 481 per 100,000
inhabitants (more than quadruple the stable rate of Figure 2).56

Fig. 4: U.S. Incarceration Rate: 2000-2017
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The flatness of Figure 4 raises the concern that we may once
again be in a stability situation, even though there is broad bipartisan agreement that the rate should be reduced.
One could also interpret Figure 4 as, finally, demonstrating
the end of the rise and the beginning of the decline from the peak
rate of 506 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2007 and 2008, which reflected an incarceration of a full 1% of the U.S. adult population.57
The 15% decline in the incarceration rate from 506 in 2008
to 440 in 2017 averaged only 1.5% per year. If the decline rate
were to double to 3% per year, it would still take 23 years to
achieve a 50% reduction in the national incarceration rate,
which is a goal championed by Michael Tonry and others that
has been seen as overly optimistic.58 An incarceration rate of 220
would still be double America’s earlier stable rate and well above
56. See supra note 15.
57. THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 6,
at 34.
58. See, e.g., AMERICAN SENTENCING: WHAT HAPPENS AND WHY? (Michael
Tonry ed., 2019).
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the rate of most other industrialized nations.59 Clearly, a more
aggressive effort at reducing the incarceration rate is needed.
A state-by-state listing of the percentage change in their incarceration rates by 2017 was provided by the Sentencing Project.60 Eleven states had only increases, but thirty-eight states
had decreases dating from earlier highs in 1999 to 2017.61 More
than half of these states (twenty) had double-digit decreases.62
Of those, California has had a 25% decrease since 200663 and
New York has had a 32% decrease since 1999;64 they are the
most striking examples. Nevertheless, the net national decrease
from 2012 to 2017 was only 7.3%.65 It was also the case that most
of the states reported a decrease in crime along with the reduction in incarceration.66 This demonstrates that the cost and human benefits of reduced incarceration without incurring a penalty of increased crime has certainly contributed to a widespread
search for approaches to contribute to further reduction at an
even greater rate. This also certainly suggests that there is a
widespread desire among the states to reduce incarceration and
that guidance on how to do so effectively would be much appreciated.
There has been considerable literature in law and criminology focused on mass incarceration and its reduction. The journal,
Criminology and Public Policy, devoted an entire issue in 2014
to the challenge of mass incarceration. In it, Michael Tonry enumerated ten reasonable actions that can be taken to reduce incarceration.67 He has carried this further with his recent book on
sentencing.68
Proposed approaches for reduction result from a review of
factors that have contributed to the growth, particularly changes

59. WALMSLEY, supra note 2.
60. NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, SENTENCING PROJECT, U.S. PRISON POPULATION TRENDS: MASSIVE BUILDUP AND MODEST DECLINE (2019), https://www
.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/U.S.-Prison-Population
-Trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HCR-MPWH].
61. Id. at 1, 5 tbl.2.
62. Id. at 4 fig.3, 5 tbl.2.
63. Id. at 5 tbl.2.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1.
67. See generally Tonry, supra note 9.
68. AMERICAN SENTENCING: WHAT HAPPENS AND WHY?, supra note 58.
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in legislation and especially changes in drug crimes. Prime targets are changes in sentencing laws, especially mandatory-minimum laws. Many states will choose to focus on changes in policies that target the crime types that have contributed to the
largest increases in prison populations. These include the large
number of people serving life sentences, especially for crimes
other than for murder (e.g., offenders with “three strikes” drug
offenses) or for somewhat remote involvement in a felony-murder offense (e.g., a participant other than the trigger puller, such
as the driver of a getaway car in a robbery-murder, often designated as “second-degree murder”), and especially for the large
number sentenced to life without parole.69 It is clear that different states will find different opportunities to reduce their prison
population and different ranges of opposition. Certainly, exploration of changes that have worked in the states with the largest
decreases like New York and California would provide important
possibilities for any state to consider.
V. ZIMRING’S PROPOSED RESPONSE
Into this array has come Frank Zimring, a distinguished
criminologist, with his particular perspective. There have been
many proposed approaches and a variety of target reductions in
the literature, many of which are reported by Zimring.70 Zimring
devotes considerable attention to what seems to be his favorite
approach—analyzing California’s Realignment approach more
broadly.71 Indeed, California has demonstrated a significant reduction in its prison population, but it did so in response to a
very insistent judicial demand, initially in 2009 by a federal appeals court and most forcefully in 2011 by the U.S. Supreme
Court.72 The response by California was the 2011 Public Safety
Realignment Act that achieved its reduction through a variety of
changes: undoing some of the mandatory sentencing laws, reducing many lesser crimes from felonies to misdemeanors, and mandating that parole violators be sentenced to jail or to communitybased treatment (especially for drug offenders who comprise a
major fraction of parole violators) rather than to prison.73 In
69. Tonry, supra note 9, at 524.
70. ZIMRING, supra note 10 (manuscript ch. 7. at 12–15).
71. Id. (manuscript ch. 5 at 18–23) (outlining four lessons from California’s
realignment system).
72. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011), aff’g Plata v. Schwarzenegger,
No. CIV S-90-520 LKK, JFM P, 2010 WL 99000 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010).
73. Assemb. B. 109, 2011–12 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
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2016, California legalized recreational marijuana by public
choice through Proposition 64.74 These and other policy or legislative changes certainly reduced the state’s prison population,
but they also resulted in some significant crowding in the local
jails with some significant negative consequences, including a
major growth in suicides within the jails.75
The most important and distinctive feature of California’s
apparently successful reduction in its prison incarceration rate,
is the fact that the state had to respond to a Supreme Court order
within a limited time.76 As with most such forced actions, there
will be side effects, and the problems of the jails were among the
most important. Zimring’s response appreciates the burden that
would be imposed on the jails, but he appreciates more the
“closer to home” value of redistributing the incarceration burden
more to jails and community organizations and less to remote
prisons.77 As a result, he calls for a major reconfiguration and
expansion of local facilities to accommodate that redistribution.78 He recognizes the problems created by the rapidity of the
redistribution under the Public Safety Realignment Act without
adequate time to prepare for it, so he argues for future planning
in that direction and with a corresponding allocation of state
funds.79 Thus, his apparent support for a reduction of prison population is in line with the California Realignment because he
sees benefit in keeping convicted offenders closer to home. Implementing his approach, however, would represent a major cost
in providing the effective local facilities called for by Zimring.
Still, there are many other approaches to be considered if
one has the time to do so. Some of the very reasonable approaches taken by California could easily be applied anywhere:

74. Control, Regulate and Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act (Prop 64), Assemb. B. 64, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016) (permitting adults twenty-one years
of age and over to possess and grow specified amounts of marijuana for recreational use).
75. Suicides Increasing in California Prisons, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE
(Oct. 4, 2019), https://eji.org/news/suicides-increasing-in-california-prisons
[https://perma.cc/GK4C-7H68].
76. See Plata, 563 U.S. at 542 (affirming appropriateness of two-year deadline, but cautioning that modification may be warranted).
77. ZIMRING, supra note 10 (manuscript ch. 5 at 34, ch. 7 at 27).
78. Id. (manuscript ch. 6 at 31–32).
79. Id.
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Cut back substantially on trying to deal with drug problems through incarceration and apply more resources to
treatment and public-health measures, approaches that
have been implemented appreciably in dealing with the
current opioid crisis.
Reconsider the seriousness of many current felony offenses, especially those that have not yet accounted for
financial inflation since their enactment.
Apply community-based treatments rather than readmission to prison for violations of probation or parole, especially for drug abuse relapses.
Consider bail reform measures that have been applied in
many jurisdictions with a significant reduction of the jail
population waiting for trial.
VI. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES

One of the distinctive features of Zimring’s forthcoming book
is his final chapter on the many collateral consequences that flow
from an individual’s interaction with the criminal justice system.
He has drawn on a list introduced by Joan Petersilia,80 but he
enumerates them with a slight reordering, along with my addition relating to the inability to apply for Pell grants to support
college tuition following a conviction:
• employment barriers and workplace restrictions;
• formal restrictions on jobs;
• bonding and licensing;
• housing restrictions;
• restrictions on parenting rights;
• special registration and public notification requirements
for sex offenders;
• voting restrictions;
• restrictions on eligibility for welfare and food stamps;81
and
• denial of access to federal Pell grants for support of college tuition.
It is clear that all but the last three of these nine restrictions, which can be seen as just more punishment, are based
on an attempt to respond to the concern that individuals may
80. See generally JOAN PETERSILIA,
ROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY (2002).

WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PA-

81. ZIMRING, supra note 10 (manuscript ch. 10 at 11 tbl.10.2).
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commit a further crime if collateral consequences were not imposed. The fact that many of those restrictions are imposed to
apply forever clearly reflects a failure to appreciate the limited
duration of this risk. Clearly, limited duration should be taken
into account so that any such restriction would only apply for a
limited period after a last conviction. Also, any such restriction
should take account of the individual’s age and recent or prior
crime types reflecting the kinds of crimes to be protected against.
Given the large number of individuals handicapped by such
rules, there are many organizations engaged in action directed
at facilitating community reentry for individuals with a prior
criminal record or upon release from incarceration. The Safer
Foundation in Chicago is a prime example of one such organization that assesses such individuals, offers them training and direction, and facilitates employment opportunities.82 One would
presume that the initial employment will be provided where
other similar employees are around to prevent any continuation
of the prior criminal activity.
It is also important to provide opportunities for “redemption” from the stigmatization of a prior record. It is well-established in criminology that an individual who has committed a
first crime has a reasonably high probability of recidivism
shortly after, but that probability declines monotonically as long
as he stays clear of further crime.83 Furthermore, at some point,
the risk of a new crime declines to the same level of risk evidenced by a person of the same age in the general population.84
The level of this risk is reflected in the classic age-crime curve
(number of arrests of individuals of a particular age divided by

82. About Us, SAFER FOUND., https://saferfoundation.org/About-us [https://
perma.cc/3YVY-K7YB] (stating that it is dedicated to promoting successful
reentry and reducing recidivism through employment, education, and support
services in Illinois).
83. See, e.g., MARIEL ALPER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2018 UPDATE
ON PRISONER RECIDIVISM: A 9-YEAR FOLLOW-UP PERIOD (2005–2014), at 5
(2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/18upr9yfup0514.pdf [https://perma
.cc/C9CV-PW2L]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE EFFECTS OF AGING ON RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL OFFENDERS 3 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2017/
20171207_Recidivism-Age.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ7J-DPHQ].
84. Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, ‘Redemption’ in an Era of
Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 263 NAT. INST. JUST. J. 10, 12–13
(2014).
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the number of people of that age in the general population).85 It
should be reasonable to view this low-risk crossing point as a
point of redemption when various restrictions could reasonably
be lifted.
That issue has been addressed by Nakamura and myself,
and we found that these redemption points typically occur after
a first-time arrestee has stayed clear of further involvement with
the criminal justice system for about seven to fifteen years depending on the age and original crime type of conviction.86 We
also examined the further sensitivity to future crime types in assessing the former offender’s riskiness and found the delay to be
longest if the concern was for a violent crime and also if the prior
arrest was for a violent crime.87
We also examined similar issues for first-time prison releasees.88 It was not surprising that the prison releasees had a
significantly higher recidivism risk than those arrested and convicted but not incarcerated.89 But it was somewhat surprising to
realize that the releasees’ risks eventually do come down to be
totally comparable to those not incarcerated, which can occur ten
to fifteen years after release.90 A smaller fraction of the releasees
reach a comparable point, but those who do should be treated
accordingly.91
VII. RECONSIDER SENTENCING CHANGES ENACTED
DURING THE 1980s AND 1990s
Probably the largest growth in incarceration is attributable
to the growing concern over violent crimes, especially murder.
Life sentences were more often mandated by legislation, even for
individuals who were held responsible for a murder committed
by a colleague and particularly for offenders with multiple drug

85. ROLF LOEBER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN 1: FROM JUVEDELINQUENCY TO YOUNG ADULT OFFENDING 3 (2013), https://www.ncjrs
.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/242931.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QMG-SAKF] (describing
the age-crime curve).
86. See generally Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 14.
87. See generally ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & KIMINORI NAKAMURA, EXTENSION
OF CURRENT ESTIMATES OF REDEMPTION TIMES: ROBUSTNESS TESTING, OUTOF-STATE ARRESTS, AND RACIAL DIFFERENCES (2012).
88. See generally Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 84.
89. Id. at 13.
90. Id.
91. Id.
NILE
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sentences.92 There was a significant growth in sentences of life
without parole.93 In fact, the Sentencing Project has estimated
that one in seven prisoners is currently serving a life sentence
and, as they age, there are significantly increasing costs for
health care and other maintenances.94 The cost of maintaining
the older prisoners is estimated to be about double that of the
average prisoner.95 As a result, there has been growing consideration of early compassionate release on parole for individuals
over a certain age.
I served on a Pennsylvania committee that recommended
consideration of parole release for prisoners older than fifty who
had served more than twenty-five years. It seemed clear that the
recidivism risk for those individuals would be minimal and the
retribution concern long gone.96 Nevertheless, a victims’ committee objected strenuously, and that was sufficient for the relevant
legislators to refuse to consider the proposal, but that was well
before the widespread national consensus on reducing prison
populations.
One approach that would seem to be reasonable in all states
would be to review the legislative changes that have occurred
since about 1980 that include mandatory-minimum laws, threestrikes sentences, fixed sentences (usually the maximum) that
replaced the previous minimum/maximum sentencing laws, and
increases in many sentences. In recent years, there has been
growing attention to an increasing number of approaches for reducing recidivism.97 Implementing those would have an obvious
effect long-term in reducing prison populations. For example, efforts at restorative judgment—involving a mediator in an interaction with the victim and offender, which seeks to get the offender to appreciate the harm caused and have the victim accept
the offender’s forgiveness—would help to reduce the risk of further offenses. When this works and the court accepts the nonincarceration outcome, one result can be one fewer prisoner.
92. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STILL LIFE: AMERICA’S INCREASING USE OF LIFE AND LONG-TERM SENTENCES 23 (2017), https://www
.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Still-Life.pdf [https://perma
.cc/PG69-Y3AB].
93. Id.
94. Id. at 5.
95. Id. at 26.
96. See supra notes 83–90 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely
Transitioning Every Person Act (First Step Act), H.R. 5682, 115th Cong. (2018).
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It is clear that most states have a strong interest in reducing
their prison population, and it is clear they can do so without
incurring increases in crime and with significant cost savings
that could be applied to a wide variety of many other needs. It
would certainly seem desirable for each and every state to create
an organizational entity, say a task force, charged with considering a variety of approaches to reducing its prison population.
Political considerations are inevitably an important part of that
effort and so would require bipartisan legislative participation.
Since the magnitude of projected population reduction is always
a consideration to counter the inevitable political opposition to
almost any such approach, an important player in the variety of
re-considerations called for is the state’s sentencing commission.
Its staff or staff in the Department of Corrections typically have
the analytic technology to estimate the impact of any policy
changes on that state’s prison population. Since racial disproportionality in prison is almost always an issue of significant concern, representatives of the relevant minority groups should be
involved to bring their perspectives and concerns into consideration. Also, since substance abuse and mental illness have become of increasing consideration in diverting offenders from
prison, expertise in treatment of these problems should certainly
be accessible to the task force.
VIII. SOME NEXT STEPS
It strikes me that most states would like to move forward in
reducing their prison populations. Doing so will require information on what works, both politically and programmatically,
and will benefit from the evaluation of initiatives undertaken in
a number of other states. There have been many proposals offering suggestions for doing so.
Zimring’s suggestions, drawing on the lessons of California
and his broader criminological involvement, are certainly interesting and to be considered. He has had an opportunity to identify the problems associated with California’s Realignment and
to offer suggestions for addressing them. These involve reconsidering the threshold between felonies and misdemeanors, and local responses to parole or probation violations, which can involve
treatment or community supervisions when appropriate, or
short sentences in local jails.98 The latter has created problems

98. See notes 70–79 and accompanying text.
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in many of the state’s jails and Zimring has offered suggestions
for addressing those problems.99
Mark Mauer has also proposed a policy that is probably the
least likely to work its way through considerable political opposition: elimination of life sentences.100 This is a response to the
considerable increase of such sentences, which currently account
for fourteen percent of all prisoners.101 An alternative that would
address the accumulation of life sentences over the past few decades is to make prisoners older than age fifty eligible for parole
review and possible release if they have served for more than
twenty-five years. This could apply to prisoners with life sentences imposed in the reasonably distant past and would take
into account any changes in their behavior over at least the past
twenty-five years.
Many states have taken a wide variety of steps to reduce
their prison populations.102 It would certainly be desirable to
have a review of the many approaches that have been taken and
compile a list of all the approaches. The Sentencing Project has
initiated such an effort in five states (Connecticut, Michigan,
Mississippi, Rhode Island, and South Carolina).103 It would be
especially helpful to accompany these with evaluation assessments of the magnitude of prison population reductions
achieved, and any increase or decrease in recidivism associated
with individuals released earlier under the previous policies.
Also, many states have introduced treatment approaches intended to reduce recidivism, including treatments while in

99. ZIMRING, supra note 10 (manuscript ch. 6 at 31–32).
100. See MARC MAUER & ASHLEY NELLIS, THE MEANING OF LIFE: THE CASE
FOR ABOLISHING LIFE SENTENCES (2018).
101. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE FACTS OF LIFE SENTENCES 1 (2018),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Facts-of-Life
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UZU-J8JX].
102. See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text.
103. DENNIS SCHRANTZ ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DECARCERATION
STRATEGIES: HOW 5 STATES ACHIEVED SUBSTANTIAL PRISON POPULATION REDUCTIONS (2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/decarceration
-strategies-5-states-achieved-substantial-prison-population-reductions [https://
perma.cc/2BEK-BWYG].
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prison, and facilitate the transition from incarceration to community living.104 A compilation of these approaches, and any estimate of their effects in crime reduction, would certainly be
helpful as well.
Finally, it would be particularly valuable for the Bureau of
Justice Assistance to establish a project with an organization
like the National Criminal Justice Association to undertake
analyses of state innovations directed at prison-population reduction. State-level surveys and assessments could be undertaken by evaluating the various approaches in terms of the magnitude of incarceration reduction achieved, much as Zimring did
with respect to California’s Realignment. This effort could result
in a handbook of approaches to prison-population reduction with
some reasonable estimates of the reductions achieved by states
that have used similar approaches. This handbook could be a developing online document to provide the necessary and sufficient
information on the magnitude of the reductions achieved and
any side effects to be considered.

104. Cf. AMERICAN SENTENCING: WHAT HAPPENS AND WHY?, supra note 58,
at 19, 21 (emphasizing the community-based aspects of treatment programs as
alternatives to incarceration).

